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Abstract 
Despite the widespread use of performance-based management (PBM) in higher education, empirical 
research on the actual impacts of PBM has remained scarce, particularly in Europe. With agency 
theory as framework, our study utilised survey data collected from Finnish universities in order to  
explore the influence of performance management on perceived teaching and research performance 
of senior academics. Our findings suggest that although academics hold a quite positive view of 
performance measurement as such, this attitude does not correlate with perceived high performance 
in either teaching or research. Moreover, our results suggest that perceived high performance among 
academics still relates primarily to acknowledgement from the academic community and academic 
achievement rather than to measurement and financial incentives. 
Introduction 
Most European countries have reformed their higher education systems during the last decade, 
placing emphasis on the quality, efficiency, and effectiveness of higher education institutions. 
Although implementation has varied at national level across countries, these reforms share some 
common elements, including awarding institutions greater level of institutional autonomy and giving 
more emphasis on performance measurement and systematic evaluation procedures (Claeys-Kulik & 
Estermann, 2015; Larsen, Maassen, & Stensaker, 2009; Maassen, Moen, & Stensaker, 2011). Yet, 
despite the widespread use of performance-based management (PBM) in European higher education 
and the volume of published research on the topic (and on performance-based funding more 
generally), surprisingly little is known about its impacts on teaching and research. Indeed, empirical 
research on the actual impacts of PBM on higher education institutions remains relatively scarce, 
especially in Europe (Kivistö & Kohtamäki, 2016).  
Since the 1990s in Finland, PBM has been the government’s main tool for creating university 
performance incentives. In line with these policies, Finnish universities have reformed their 
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management structures, adopting internal policies and funding systems that emphasise performance. 
However, to this date, studies focusing on the actual performance impacts of the Finnish PBM have 
remained almost non-existent in higher education sector. 
 
To address the lack of knowledge about the impacts of PBM on higher education institutions, the 
present study analyses survey data collected from Finnish universities in 2015 to answer the following 
research question: To what extent has the performance management influenced teaching and research 
performance as perceived by senior academic staff? To guide our analysis, we will utilise the agency 
theory (also known as principal-agent theory) as an analytical framework. By virtue of its generic 
nature, agency theory has become increasingly popular as a conceptual tool for modelling the 
underlying dynamics of accountability and trust relationships in higher education settings (see e.g. 
Auld, 2010; Borgos, 2013; Enders, de Boer, & Weyer, 2013; Kivistö, 2007; Kivistö & Zalyevska, 
2015; Lane, Kinser, & Knox, 2013; Lane & Kivistö, 2008; Liefner, 2003). To date, however, 
relatively few empirical studies have applied agency theory, especially among those utilising 
quantitative methods. For that reason, this paper also aims to contribute to the assessment of agency 
theory’s explanatory potential in the context of PBM in higher education sector.  
 
The article is structured as follows: After the introduction, we outline the analytical framework 
containing discussion on the impacts of PBM and the basic features of agency theory, and then 
introduce shortly the policy context related to Finnish performance-based management of 
universities. Then we turn to describe the data, methods and variables which is then followed by 
descriptive  and  correlative  analyses.  In  the  final  section,  we  offer  discussion  on  the  results  of  the  
analyses and link this discussion to the analytical framework, at the same time drawing conclusions 
and discuss the implications of our study. 
 
 
Analytical framework 
 
In brief, PBM can be defined as the use of resources and information to achieve and demonstrate 
progress towards an organisation’s goals (e.g. Wholey, 1999). It is often seen as a tool for increasing 
institutional awareness of targeted policy objectives and for ensuring accountability in accomplishing 
those objectives. Often (if not always), PBM utilises performance-based remuneration at two levels: 
performance-based funding for institutions and performance-based salaries for individuals. At both 
levels, the amount of remuneration is linked by a formula to measurable achievement or performance. 
In a higher education context, most of the performance indicators measure either progress towards or 
completion of final outputs related to teaching and research such as study credits, number of degrees 
awarded, publications, competitive research funding awarded, citations, patents, level of 
competitive/external research funding, or student satisfaction (e.g. Kivistö & Kohtamäki, 2016).  
 
The principal rationale for introducing PBM practices is to improve institutional performance. This 
is grounded in an implicit belief that performance-based funding will incentivise institutions to 
improve or maintain their level of performance in exchange for higher revenue (Dougherty & Reddy, 
2011). By reformulating incentives so that institutions are rewarded or punished primarily according 
to actual performance, PBM looks to stimulate a shift in institutional behaviour towards greater 
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efficiency (Kivistö & Kohtamäki, 2016; Rutherford & Rabovsky, 2014). However, despite the 
prevalence of PBM, surprisingly little is known about its actual impacts on institutional behaviour 
and performance. In particular, Kivistö and Kohtamäki’s (2016) extensive literature review suggested 
that very little is known about how and why PBM affects the behaviour of higher education 
institutions as organisations and of academics as individuals, and the presumed linear or even causal 
relationship between performance incentives, organisational behaviour, and performance remains, in 
many respects, surprisingly unclear. For policy making as well as academic research, then, a better 
understanding  is  needed  of  the  logic  of  PBM.  Clarification  of  how  PBM  impacts  on  institutional  
behaviour, and how this behaviour translates (or does not translate) into shifts in performance, seems 
crucial for any meaningful evaluation of the effectiveness of PBM practices. 
 
Many important aspects of PBM align with the basic features and general setting of agency theory 
(Kivistö, 2005; Kivistö & Zalyevska, 2015). Agency theory analyses the relationship between two or 
more parties, in which one party (designated the principal) engages another party (designated the 
agent) to perform some task on their behalf (e.g. Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Moe, 1984; Ross, 1973). 
The theory assumes that, on delegating authority to agents, principals often have problems controlling 
them because the agents’ goals may differ from their own (goal conflicts), and because agents often 
have better information about their own capacity and activities (informational asymmetries). Taken 
together, these goal conflicts and informational asymmetries trigger favourable conditions for the 
emergence of ‘moral hazard’, leading to opportunistic, self-serving behaviour on the part of the agent 
(Kivistö & Zalyevska, 2015).  
 
The principal has two basic contractual options for controlling opportunistic behaviour: ‘behaviour-
based’ contracts and ‘outcome-based’ contracts. In the case of behaviour-based contracts, the 
principal invests in monitoring the agent’s actions to reduce the level of informational asymmetry 
and then remunerates the agent on the basis of the observed behaviour. In the case of outcome-based 
contracts, on the other hand, the principal remunerates the agent on the basis of outcomes produced. 
Here, the rationale is to reduce goal conflicts by incentivising the agent to pursue outcomes that are 
compatible with the principal’s goals (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989; Kivistö, 2007).  
 
In higher education settings, agency theory has proved useful as an analytical framework, especially 
for understanding relationships between government and higher education institutions (e.g. Auld, 
2010; Blalark, 2012; Kivistö, 2005, 2007). However, the theory has also been applied in various other 
settings—for instance, in assessing the relationships between individual academics and university 
leaders (e.g. Wangenge-Ouma, Lutomiah, & Langa, 2015). It seems likely, then, that the standard 
principal-agent model outlined above can illuminate the underlying logic of PBM with some 
accuracy, as the rationale for goal setting and performance measurement embedded in PBM practices 
can be directly explained by an implicit assumption of existing/potential goal conflicts and 
informational asymmetries between governments and institutions or, alternatively, between 
institutional management and subunits or individual academics. In fact, PBM is based on a relatively 
simple anticipated causal chain, in which restructuring performance incentives (i.e. applying 
outcome-based contracts) at the level of institutions and individuals would automatically translate 
into changes in the behaviour of units and individual academics, leading ultimately to improvements 
in teaching and research performance.  
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The logics that inform the basic assumptions of agency theory and PBM can be captured in a single 
essential  question:  ‘What  motivates  academics  as  agents?’  If  financial  remuneration  based  on  
performance is the main incentive attached to standard PBM practices but lacks motivational value 
for academics, the whole rationale of PBM is thrown into doubt. On that basis, we propose the 
following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: More than other motivational factors, financial incentives are statistically correlating 
with academics’ perceived performance. (H1)  
 
Secondly, motivation can also be affected by other factors that are essential to PBM effectiveness. If 
the act of performance measurement is interpreted by academics as indicating mistrust rather than as 
a positive incentive, it is likely to have a negative impact on their performance level. For instance, 
Jacobsen and Andersen’s (2014) study of academics’ motivation indicated that while payments 
perceived by their recipients as ‘controlling’ decreased their intrinsic motivation and reduced work 
effort and performance, payments perceived by their recipients as ‘supportive’ had the opposite effect. 
Academics (researchers in particular) seem to respond more positively to financial incentives when 
they find them supportive. In particular, acceptance of the evaluation criteria of performance-related 
schemes (rather than the size of the financial package) seems to be crucial for their effectiveness 
(Andersen & Pallesen, 2008). On that basis, we propose the following two hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Attitude to performance measurement as a form of control is statistically correlating 
with individual perceived performance in teaching and in research. (H2) 
 
Hypothesis 3: The assumed impact of measurement on performance is statistically correlating with 
individual perceived performance in teaching and in research. (H3) 
 
 
Policy context  
 
The university sector in Finland is governed by the Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC), 
principally through legislation, performance agreements, and performance-based funding. National 
legislation—in particular, the Universities Act, which was completely reformed in 2009–2010—has 
a strong regulatory impact on the Finnish university sector. This legislation determines many of the 
sector’s essential features, including the number of universities, universities’ missions and tasks, 
governance and administrative structures and bodies, and regulations related to studies and studying 
and to academic staff.  
 
In relation to performance-based funding, MoEC currently applies one of the most performance-
oriented funding models in Europe (see de Boer et al., 2015). The current model is the fruit of a long 
historical trajectory of continuous development towards a more performance-oriented model. After 
many years of applying incremental, line-item budgeting procedures in funding universities’ 
operating costs, MoEC adopted a new policy in the early 1990s, introducing a lump sum allocation 
model that included minor performance-based incentives. The late 1990s and early 2000s witnessed 
the introduction of funding model driven more by output and performance. As this change was so 
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radical, the new performance-based funding model was implemented in phases during the period 
1998–2003. The objective of the new model was to ensure accountability by offering incentives for 
universities to increase their efficiency and effectiveness and the quality of education and research. 
 
During the period 2003–2013, MoEC allocated core funding for universities by means of a 
performance-based formula, covering approximately 70–90% of total core state funding. The policy 
of the MoEC has been to upgrade this model every three years, which was the standard duration of 
these performance agreements in the period 2003–2013. In 2013–2015, the allocation model was 
restructured to further increase its clarity and transparency while offering stronger but fewer 
incentives for universities to achieve expected outputs and outcomes. In addition to reducing the 
number of indicators, the 2013–2015 model also introduced some new ones. In the education 
component of the model, these new indicators included number of students who have gained more 
than 55 study credits (ECTS) within one academic year, study credits for open university and non-
degree programmes, number of employed graduates, and Master’s degrees awarded to foreign 
nationals.  In  the  research  component  of  the  model,  new  indicators  included  a  revised  way  of  
calculating scientific publications, which were now tied to the national classification schemes known 
as the “Publication Forum” for impact assessment, along with international teaching and research 
personnel and PhD degrees awarded to foreign nationals.  
 
 
Data, methods and variables 
 
The data referred to here were collected in 2015 as part of the FINNUT-PERFECT project, funded 
by the Research Council of Norway, which focused on the impacts of management reforms in four 
Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The survey included questions on 
decision-making, performance management, incentives, organisational structures, strategy process, 
funding, support services, autonomy, control, and working atmosphere. The Finnish sample 
encompassed all 14 of the country’s universities, with responses from all disciplines and educational 
fields. In total, the data set included the responses of 956 senior academics. The response rate for 
academic managers’ was 44%; for other senior academicians, it was 24%. Here, to increase the 
precision of our analysis, we include only the responses of senior academics not holding an official 
management  position  (n  =  672).  The  data  were  analysed  by  means  of  descriptive  statistics,  cross-
tabulations, correlations, and mean analysis. The correlative analysis employed a non-parametrical 
technique (Spearman’s rho). The descriptive statistics are summarised in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. Study sample: descriptive statistics  
 
Focusing only on senior academics (professors and associate professors) can be backed by the 
following reasons. Firstly, senior academics often enjoy a relatively stable career structures combined 
with  a  great  level  of  professional  autonomy,  which  means  that  they  are  the  ‘core’  or  ‘pure’  
manifestation of the academic profession in Finnish universities (Pekkola, 2009; Pekkola, 2014; 
Pekkola, Siekkinen, Kivistö & Lyytinen, 2017). Secondly, the duties of senior academics typically 
include a more balanced mixture of academic tasks (research, teaching, third mission activities and 
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administration) compared to their junior colleagues, who often hold fixed-term positions with a more 
misbalanced set of tasks (e.g. bias towards teaching) (Aarrevaara & Pekkola, 2010; Kuoppala et al., 
2015; Pekkola, 2010;). However, senior academics who were at the same time holding a management 
position (e.g. as deans or department heads) were excluded from our sample as the management role 
may alter their perceptions on performance (Lind, Pekkola, Stensaker, & Söderlind, 2016; Pekkola, 
Siekkinen, Kivistö & Lyytinen, 2017) and because some of the survey items utilised in the analysis 
were not included in the version of questionnaire sent to managers. 
 
 
Perceived high performance  
We analysed both high research performance and high teaching performance in terms of respondents’ 
perceptions. ‘Perceived high performance’ in research and teaching was measured using a single-item 
five-point Likert scale variable: ‘Compared with colleagues in similar positions in my unit, in the last 
three years, I have published more’ and ‘Compared with colleagues in similar positions in my unit, 
in the last three years, I have had more teaching’. The five-point scale ranged from strongly disagree 
to strongly agree. Defining performance in a narrow sense, these variables resonate with definitions 
of performance in performance management systems. To overcome the apparent differences between 
disciplines and units, the proposition in the questionnaire was formulated in relative terms (referring 
to ‘colleagues in my own unit’). However, this formulation could not take account of differences in 
work tasks; for this reason, our analysis deals with perceived performance in relation to the work 
orientation of academics (as explained next).  
 
Work orientation 
In the complete Nordic data set, containing survey data from all four Nordic countries, academics 
were divided into three equally sized groups (tertiles) according to the content of their work. To define 
the cutting points, proportional share of teaching and research was subtracted from actual working 
time. An academic was considered to be teaching-oriented if their teaching time was more than 10 
percentage points greater than the share of their time allocated to research. They were considered to 
be research-oriented if their research time was more than 15 percentage points greater than the share 
of their time allocated to teaching activities. Academics with a ‘balanced’ orientation fell between 
these limits.   
 
Motivational factors 
An individual’s motivational factors were measured by a single-item variable on a five-point scale, 
including ‘acknowledgements from unit manager’, ‘acknowledgements from academic staff of 
[respondent’s] own unit’, ‘acknowledgements from external colleagues’, ‘acknowledgements from 
external stakeholders’, ‘acknowledgements from students’, ‘media attention’, and ‘financial 
incentives’.  
 
Attitude to performance measurement 
Negative attitude to performance measurement was measured by a single-item variable: ‘In my 
opinion, performance measurement is a sign of mistrust’. Positive attitude towards performance 
measurement was measured by the variable ‘In my opinion, measurement increases transparency and 
fairness’.   
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Positive attitude to the performance impact of performance measurement was measured by a sum 
variable (alpha = .857) formed from four different variables measuring positive performance impact 
of performance measurement on research and teaching.  
 
 
Descriptive analysis 
 
On the research side, perceived performance naturally varies among academics with different 
orientations; almost a third of research-oriented staff (32%) strongly agree that they have published 
more than their colleagues in a similar position as compared to 15% of teaching-oriented staff. 
However, there are no major differences between academics with a more or less balanced working 
orientation when compared to academics in research-oriented positions (Table 2). In relation to 
perceived teaching performance, there are also clear differences. Although the difference between 
research-oriented and teaching oriented academics is wider, a clear difference can also be found 
between teaching-oriented and balanced academics (Table 3). This may be explained by the few 
available senior-level teaching positions in Finland, which would not include research activities. 
Regardless of more or less similar expectations on the research front, teaching loads might differ 
significantly.  
 
Table 2. ‘Compared with colleagues in similar positions in my unit, I have published more in the last three 
years’. (Chi sq 46.269; df 8; p < .001) 
 
Table 3. ‘Compared with colleagues in similar positions in my unit, I have had more teaching in the last three 
years’. (Chi sq 121.89; df 8; p < .001) 
 
The survey results indicate that academics do not assign high importance to financial incentives as 
compared to other motivational factors (Figure 1), echoing similar results from other Nordic counties 
(Lind et al., 2016). It seems that the implementation of performance-based mechanisms for steering 
and management have not had a great impact on the traditional motivational structure of academic 
work, which emphasises intrinsic motivation—that is, performing academic work for its inherent 
satisfaction and without regard to cost-benefit considerations (Kroner, 2015; Ryan & Deci, 2000). It 
would be interesting to explore whether experienced importance of financial incentives is linked to 
perceived performance, as that would imply that performance management systems tend especially 
to motivate those individuals who appreciate financial incentives.  
 
 
Figure 1. What motivates you as an academic (%)? 
 
 
The overall attitude to performance measurement is surprisingly positive; almost 70% of respondents 
do not dispute the claim that performance measurement increases transparency and fairness, and more 
than half of the respondents do not consider performance measurement as a sign of mistrust (Figure 
2). As to the actual impacts of performance measurement, more than half of the respondents either 
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agree with (around 20%) or are neutral about (35%) the claim that performance measurement 
increases performance level.  
 
 
Figure 2. Attitudes towards performance measurement (%). 
 
 
Correlative analysis 
 
We now turn to our analysis of the study hypotheses (H1–H3). Based on the cross-tabulations in 
Table 4, only a few statistically significant correlations can be found between importance of 
motivational factors and perceived performance. Financial incentives seem to exhibit a positive 
correlation with research performance among teaching-oriented staff whose perceived research 
performance is high but not among research-oriented staff whose perceived research performance is 
high.  Additionally,  the  importance  of  acknowledgement  from  external  colleagues  (r  =.160)  is  
positively correlated with teachers’ publication performance. Based on this finding (and keeping in 
mind the low correlations), it can be inferred that those teachers for whom financial incentives and 
acknowledgement from external colleagues is important want to publish more, but this has no impact 
on their perceived teaching performance. Another interesting (although weak) pair of correlations can 
be found between opinions on the importance of acknowledgement from students. It seems that this 
is considered important by respondents with higher perceived teaching performance and lower 
perceived research performance. This suggests that importance of the content/quality of work as 
judged by the students has performance implications that might mean lower performance in other 
tasks. This also indicates that acknowledgement from students particularly motivates teaching-
oriented staff with high perceived teaching performance (r. =-.153) and low perceived research 
performance (r. =-.221).      
 
For ‘balanced’ academics, we found only one statistically significant, low negative correlation (r =-
.195) between unit manager acknowledgement and perceived research performance. This means that 
those academics who value their unit manager’s acknowledgement perceive themselves as weaker 
research performers. This may imply that time and effort spent for impressing a unit or unit manager 
(i.e. to gain their acknowledgement) conflicts with the time and effort to be allocated to research 
activities, assuming that teaching duties are usually more constant. For research-oriented academics, 
the only statistically significant correlation (r =.218) is between importance of student 
acknowledgement and perceived teaching performance. This may indicate that those academics who 
appreciate student acknowledgement have more teaching duties; it seems unconnected with perceived 
research performance. 
 
Overall, it can be concluded that importance of motivational factors has only a minor connection with 
perceived high performance in both research and teaching, and that there is no linear connection 
between opinion about the importance of financial incentives and perceived performance, either in 
research or in teaching. On that basis, H1 (More than other motivational factors, financial incentives 
are linearly connected to academics’ perceived performance) is rejected. 
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Table 4. Correlations between perceived performance and importance of motivational factors 
 
 
Our analysis shows (Table 5) that there is no strong linear correlation (in either direction) between 
the variables ‘attitude towards performance measurement as a control’ and ‘perceived performance’ 
in either research or teaching. However, some differences in attitude can be observed between 
teaching- and research-oriented staff. Among teaching-oriented staff, positive attitude towards 
measurement exhibits a weak but positive statistically significant correlation (r =.157) with perceived 
research performance for teaching-oriented respondents who publish more than their colleagues. In 
the case of academics with a balanced work orientation and academics with research-orientation, no 
such correlation exists. A second statistically significant but weak correlation (r =.171) exists between 
negative attitude towards performance measurement and research-oriented staff who are more 
engaged in teaching. Together, these two findings may indicate that either ability (in the case of 
teaching-oriented academics who publish more than their colleagues) or opportunity (in the case of 
research-oriented academics who need to teach more) are to some extent also related to attitudes to 
performance measurement. While those who are able to publish more despite their teaching load feel 
more positively disposed to performance measurement, those who publish less because of their 
teaching load have negative feelings about performance measurement. Interestingly, the correlation 
between perceived performance and negative attitude towards performance measurement is 
statistically significant and negative (r =-.242). Those who view performance measurement as a sign 
of mistrust do not see themselves as high performers; this applies only to those with a balanced work 
orientation.  
 
Although some individual connections can be found between performance measurement as a form of 
control and perceived performance, the overall conclusion is that there is no major link between these. 
On that basis, H2 (Attitude to performance measurement as a form of control is linearly connected to 
individual perceived performance in teaching and in research) is rejected. 
 
 
Table 5. Correlations between perceived performance and attitude towards performance measurement 
 
 
As shown by the correlations in Table 6, the impacts of performance measurement on academics’ 
perceived performance exhibit no statistically significant connections (in either direction). The only 
exception to this general observation is the statistically significant correlation (r =.248) between 
balanced academics who consider themselves higher performers in teaching and the belief that 
performance measurement and control increase performance. Despite this deviation, H3 (The assumed 
impact of measurement on performance is linearly connected to individual perceived performance in 
teaching and in research) is also rejected. 
 
 
Table 6. Correlations between perceived performance and opinion on the performance impact of 
performance measurement 
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Overall, our results demonstrate that there is no linear connection between attitude to performance 
measurement or its impact on performance and perceived high teaching or research performance (H2 
and H3). Contrary to H1, we also found that opinion about the importance of financial incentives does 
not correlate with perceived high teaching or research performance. However, there are differences 
between academics with differing work orientations. Among teaching-oriented academics, positive 
attitude to performance measurement correlates with high publication performance. Among research-
oriented staff, negative attitude to performance measurement correlates with high teaching 
performance. It also seems that financial incentives and acknowledgements from external colleagues 
(i.e. colleagues working in other units or higher education institutions) particularly motivate those 
teaching-oriented academics whose perceived research performance is high. Again, those teaching- 
and research-oriented academics whose perceived teaching performance is high consider 
acknowledgement from students to be an important motivating factor. The results suggest that the 
role of incentives in supporting research performance may be important, especially for those 
academics whose main tasks are not primarily research-related. This also resonates with recent 
changes in the funding and salary systems of Finnish universities, which emphasise the quantity and 
quality of scientific publications as performance criteria. Instead, acknowledgement from students 
can boost the teaching performance of teaching- and research-oriented academics whose perceived 
teaching performance is high.  
 
Even though focusing on perceived (self-reported) performance has several weaknesses compared to 
focusing on actual (objectively measured) performance, this approach can be justified on following 
grounds. Firstly, the lack of actual performance data at the individual level and challenges in 
connecting this performance data with the variables of the survey made this option impossible within 
the  context  of  this  study.  Secondly,  even  though  focusing  on  perceptions  includes  a  risk  that  
respondents are inaccurate is assessing their own performance, this risk is greatly mitigated in the 
Finnish context due to the performance appraisals and performance-based salary negotiations which 
the academic staff and their superiors need to undergo in every two years. These practises increase 
the possibility that the academic staff are fully aware of their true teaching and research performance. 
Moreover, one could assume that there are seemingly no rational reasons to exaggerate the level of 
performance in anonymous survey responses. 
 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
Our results indicate that although senior academics have a quite positive view of performance 
measurement as such, this attitude does not correlate with perceived high performance in either 
teaching or research. These findings may have implications for practical aspects of PBM and for 
theoretical aspects of agency theory. The fact that financial incentives as motivational factors are not 
directly related to perceived performance conflicts with the basic assumptions of PBM that individual 
academics place insufficient emphasis on performance or that they are wilfully bypassing 
opportunities to improve performance unless clearly incentivised to do so (Kivistö & Kohtamäki, 
2016). Based on the present findings, it seems that the motivation for high performance among 
academics still relates primarily to acknowledgement from the academic community and academic 
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achievement—in other words, from something closer to intrinsic motivation—than from 
measurement and financial incentives. Even though this finding does not suggest that PBM policies 
do not have any impact on the behaviour of academics, it nevertheless implies that the estimated 
impacts of the PBM should not be overestimated due to the motivational factors of individual 
academics.    
 
From this vantage, our results also do not support the assumption of agency theory that outcome-
based contracts represent an efficient means of aligning the interests of principals and agents (e.g. 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Kivistö, 2005) in an academic context. These findings align with the few existing 
empirical studies investigating the system-level impacts of performance-based funding (e.g. Hillman, 
Tandberg, & Fryar, 2015; Rutherford & Rabovsky, 2014; Sanford & Hunter, 2011; Tandberg & 
Hillman, 2013). None of these studies found any evidence that performance-based funding had 
increased institutional performance in terms of rates of completion, retention, and graduation. 
Moreover, our findings provide no support for the assumption that academics’ attitudes to 
performance measurement might somehow be related to perceived high teaching and research 
performance. This finding suggests that perceiving performance measurement as either controlling or 
supportive is not linked to academics’ level of performance. Specifically, the assumption that 
performance-based measurement would ‘crowd out’ intrinsic motivation if academics perceived it as 
controlling their work finds no support from our study (cf. Andersen & Pallesen, 2008; Frey & Jegen, 
2001). From the perspective of PBM, this implies that performance measurement itself (with or 
without attached financial incentives) does not increase academics’ motivation to perform better (or 
worse). Furthermore, this finding, although indirectly, provides no support for the agency theory 
assumption that monitoring (in the form of behaviour-based contracts) would in itself incentivise 
agents to act in the best interests of the principal.    
 
As a principal limitation of this study, it should be acknowledged that performance level was defined 
in terms of ‘perceived high performance’ as determined by individual academics. For that reason, we 
cannot actually say anything about the correlations between our independent variables and the ‘actual’ 
performance of individuals independent of their own perceptions. In addition, the correlations 
identified in our analysis are weak (although statistically significant). From the correlative analysis, 
we can conclude that there are no clear linear connections and that there are apparent differences 
between groups defined according to their work orientation. However, further empirical studies will 
be needed in order to determine the actual impacts of performance-based management on behaviour 
and on the performance of individual academics and institutions as a whole. More studies would be 
also needed in the future for clarifying the level of accuracy between perceived performance 
measured individual and organisational level performance and to find out whether these are associated 
with the differences of motivational factors of individuals. 
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Table 1.  
    
Title 
 
n %  
Professor (career stage IV) 259 38.5  
Associate professor (career stage 
III) 
413 61.5 
Employment contract 
  
 
Permanent position 429 63.9  
Tenure track 39 5.8  
Temporary teaching and/or 
research position 
192 28.6 
 
Other 11 1.6 
Gender 
   
 
Female 277 41.8  
Male 386 58.2 
Field of science 
  
 
Natural Sciences 183 27.2  
Engineering and Technology 85 12.6  
Medical and Health Sciences 81 12.1  
Agricultural Sciences 15 2.2  
Social Sciences 165 24.6  
Humanities 117 17.4  
Other, please specify 26 3.9 
Orientation    
 Teaching 212 37.7 
 Research 206 36.7 
 Balanced 144 25.6 
    
Weekly Working hours Mean 46.6  
 Standard deviation 9.2  
 
 
Table 2.   
  
WORK 
ORIENTATION 
  
  
Teaching Balanced Research Total 
1 (STRONGLY DISAGREE) % 13 3 3 7 
2 % 20 9 11 14 
3 % 35 30 28 31 
4 % 17 28 28 24 
5 (STRONGLY AGREE) % 15 31 32 25 
TOTAL n 184 134 181 499  
% 100 100 100 100 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. 
   
WORK 
ORIENTATION 
  
  
Teaching Balanced Research Total 
1 (STRONGLY 
DISAGREE) 
% 1 7 19 9 
2 % 7 20 33 20 
3 % 27 35 31 30 
4 % 30 20 11 20 
5 (STRONGLY 
AGREE) 
% 35 20 6 21 
TOTAL n 189 133 177 499  
% 100 100 100 100 
 
Table 4.  
Work 
orientation 
  U
nit m
anager 
A
cad. staff in m
y 
unit 
Ext. colleagues 
Ext. stakeholders 
Students 
 Financial 
incentives 
M
edia attention 
Teaching 
 
Published more r -0.005 -0.077 .160* 0.09 -.221** .161* 0.042    
p 0.945 0.305 0.03 0.248 0.003 0.031 0.576    
N 177 182 183 168 184 178 180   
Taught more r -0.096 -0.053 -0.042 0.113 .153* 0.058 0.031    
p 0.197 0.471 0.566 0.144 0.037 0.438 0.673  
  N 181 186 186 169 188 181 183 
Balanced  Published more r -.195* -0.069 0.043 -0.028 -0.082 0.103 0.068    
p 0.026 0.43 0.622 0.754 0.347 0.238 0.435    
N 131 133 134 127 132 133 133  
 Taught more r -0.066 0.048 -0.052 -0.116 0.129 -0.083 0.026    
p 0.456 0.583 0.552 0.197 0.141 0.344 0.767    
N 130 132 133 126 131 132 132 
Research  Published more r 0.046 0.08 0.082 0.008 0.006 0.006 -0.011    
p 0.551 0.29 0.273 0.915 0.937 0.936 0.883    
N 173 178 180 168 179 173 179  
 Taught more r 0.051 -0.017 0.032 0.058 .218** 0.077 0.097    
p 0.511 0.824 0.676 0.466 0.004 0.323 0.202    
N 169 174 176 163 176 169 175 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
     
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
     
 
 
Table 5. 
Work orientation 
 
Negative Positive 
Teaching Published more r -0.074 .157*  
 p 0.334 0.037  
 N 171 177  
Taught more r 0.068 -0.04  
 p 0.372 0.591  
 N 174 180 
Balanced Published more r -.242** 0.053  
 p 0.006 0.55  
 N 129 128  
Taught more r -0.132 0.154  
 p 0.138 0.083  
 N 128 127 
research Published more r -0.103 0.007   
p 0.176 0.931   
N 175 176 
 Taught more r .171* -0.089   
p 0.025 0.247   
N 171 172 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Work orientation 
 
Performance 
measurement 
and control 
increases 
performance 
Teaching Published more r 0.031   
p 0.678   
n 182  
Taught more r -0.045   
p 0.544   
n 187 
Balanced Published more r 0.137   
p 0.115   
n 134  
Taught more r .248**   
p 0.004   
n 133 
Research Published more r 0.117   
p 0.12   
n 179  
Taught more r 0.046   
p 0.546   
n 175 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
Table 7.  
Work orientation 
 
Published 
more 
Taught 
more 
Negative Positive 
Teaching Work hours r 0.122 0.084 0.062 0.006   
p 0.1 0.25 0.407 0.935   
n 184 189 180 186   
n 128 127 131 131 
Balanced Work hours r 0.035 0.111 0.103 0.005   
p 0.686 0.201 0.24 0.959   
n 134 133 132 131 
Research Work hours r .164* 0.137 0.072 -0.036   
p 0.028 0.071 0.337 0.628   
n 180 176 181 182 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
  
Figure 1 
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